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1. Introduction
Bulgaria is located on the Balkan Peninsula together with Albania, Greece,
Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and part of Turkey. This region with its
great diversity stands as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
The geographical location and the complexity of the area have always
played a significant role in the history of the Balkan peninsula and the
Bulgarian people which has repeatedly been sucked into a cultural,
economic,  and historical vortex. The country is one of the oldest
European states. Founded in 681 and one of the first political formations in
Eastern Europe, it turned into a monarchy in 1887 and has been a republic
since 1946.
Before the break-down of communism in 1989, Bulgaria’s economy was
centrally planned, hierarchical, and highly monopolized. Concerning its
industry, the country has tried everything except a market economy. It has
only been modified by  administrative/incentive attempts at improving the
planning mechanisms. After the failure of the communist system, an
extremely complex political, economic, and social situation has surfaced.
The situation is very unstable, increasingly chaotic, and explosive.
Bulgaria is certainly not one of the success stories in Eastern Europe. Not
very much has been accomplished in the country from a reform point of
view. It is not among the countries advanced in the transition to a market-
based economy. Bulgaria belongs to the group of countries that are at an
intermediate stage of transition. This group also includes Albania, FYR
Macedonia, Romania, and most of the CIS (EBRD, Transition Report,
1996). Especially after 1994, the reform pace slowed down visibly and
1996 can be described as an economic disaster. Bulgaria did not apply a
shock therapy, but it did not undertake a policy of careful balancing
structural reform, growth, and social welfare either.
2Six years after the beginning of the political and economic changes in
Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria is in a deep crisis. In a state of
significant changes, the “going-back-to-zero rule” (Barker, 1992:140;
Luthans & Lee, 1994:7) seems to illustrate well the starting point of the
transformation. The conditions in the transition period are extreme. The
drama of changing the centrally planned economy involves the break-down
of institutions, a severe economic recession, and heavy social problems.
Clear results are the negative growth of the GNP compared to 19891,
increasing inflation, organized crime, rapid depreciation of the national
currency, incoherent economic policies, and fear of “a bread and grain
crisis”. The resource balance is missing and the budget is in bad shape.
Economic forecasts about the economic development of Bulgaria are not
made, and no macroeconomic models are developed which could form the
basis for economic restructuring programs.
Other negative tendencies are social alienation, social conflicts, growing
aggressiveness, crime, and corruption. The fall in living standards for 90%
of the population in the country is visible. Since 1990, Bulgarians have lost
what is the equivalent of more than 65% in their real income.
Unemployment rates are increasing,  domestic demand is falling, and
demographic trends are alarming2.
The present paper gives a descriptive overview of the transition processes
in Bulgaria although it does not analyze these processes in-depth. As a
background, a short overview is given of Bulgaria’s past socialist
economic development with focus on its key feature, the central planning
system (Section 2). The political situation in the first years of transition is
then looked closer at in Section 3. Stabilization and liberalization measures
are discussed in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 focuses mainly on the
                                                 
1  Poland is the only country in the region to have surpassed the 1989 level of GDP.
2 Bulgarian population has been declining ever since 1990 and following the projections, this trend
will continue if the country’s economic and social development does not improve. Decisive factors
3privatization process which is one of the most essential parts of
institutional and enterprise restructuring in the transitional countries. While
in the West, privatization became an issue of importance in the late 1970s,
it is a new phenomenon for the ex-socialist countries. The paper outlines
the privatization process as it took place in the period 1992-1996 although
a few indicators are also from early 1997. Post-privatization management
is not addressed although it is a controversial issue. Section 7 discusses
restructuring within the context of stabilization, liberalization, and
privatization.
2. Bulgaria’s Economy before 1990: Central Planning
In Socialist Bulgaria, the main economic sector was built on the principle
of public ownership of the means of production in state-owned
enterprises. Strong emphasis was put on industrialization with the aim to
overcome the relatively slow development process from a rather traditional
agrarian society. The country used the classical Soviet economic model
and was heavily involved in the intra-bloc division and specialization
philosophy practiced in the CMEA countries. The economic environment
was stable and predictable. Concentration on heavy i dustry gave rise to
the development of large-scale bureaucratic organizations, supervised by
the ruling party’s political elite, exercising control over companies and
their activities. The high degree of industrial concentration n the
manufacturing sector did not open up for any competition. In most
industries, an almost monopoly-like situation prevailed as a result of the
socialist principle “More of the same”.
The key element in the Communist doctrine which prevailed for decades in
all socialist countries, including Bulgaria, was the central planning
mechanism. 3 Balicki (1983) describes an economy as being centrally
planned when the authorities both design a plan and how its objectives are
                                                                                                                                
that have contributed to the unfavorable demographic situation are falling birth rates, increasing
mortality and emigration.
4to be reached. He points out that “this special way is firstly based on the
fact that every producer receives an individual strictly defined and
separately to him addressed production task which is part of the global
plan. Secondly, it is based on the fact that the refusal to execute this
instruction (or its acceptance and non-execution) is stipulated by a number
of formal and informal, legal and illegal sanctions far exceeding afflictions
of financial nature” (op.cit.:9). In the shape of five-, three, one-, half-year
and even three-month, and monthly plans directives were given from the
top of the ruling party’s political hierarchy to enterprises. While the top
was interested in maintaining administrative command over economic
activities, the enterprises aimed at reaching a production result which
reached the plan objective in quantitative terms. “Storming” (the
concentration of efforts at the end of the month to meet the indicators set
by the plan) was a common and wide-spread practice.
The planning practice is called “planning without facts” by Drewnowski
(1982:79), i.e., planning without information or based on inadequate and
limited information4 which automatically leads to wrong decisions. This
caused enormous coordination difficulties and problems in the central
planning system. Furthermore, the state plan is an ideological rather than
an economic program - it was called “a second Party program”. Rigidities
in the central planning system had some well-known and inherent
contradictions: stagnation in production, permanent shortages and
dissatisfied consumers, disequilibrium between supply and demand,
shoddy quality, wage equalization, and economic mismanagement.
However, to explain the socialist economic development only within the
framework of the central planning system in the years prior to the start of
transition would be a simplification. Besides the widely used model of
                                                                                                                                
3 The practice of developing five-year plans was introduced in the Soviet Union by Stalin in 1928 and
widely transferred in the East European countries and China in mid-1940s.
4 Naughton (1990) has cited a Soviet economist who has calculated that a fully balanced, checked and
detailed economic plan for the next year would be ready, if using supercomputers, in 30,000 years.
5formal central planning, the socialist economy allowed the development of
parallel informal networks and structures known as the “shadow
economy” (“second economy”, or “underground economy”). The “second
economy” as a contrast to the “first (state sector) economy” is defined as
“income-producing activities, legal, tolerated, or illegal, of households that
occur outside employment in the organizations of the state sector” (Stark,
1989:137). This is an important consideration bearing in mind that it not
the entire socialist system has collapsed in late 1989 - the first years of
transition have legalized part of the former shadow economy. From an
institutional point of view, the underground economy has at least three
features that make a significant contribution to social change processes.
First, it allows and gives space for private initiatives. Secondly, it gives
subordinate groups more room to defend or improve their standard of
living. Third, it limits the state-party officials in their freedom to act, and it
provides fertile ground on which new institutional forms can grow (Mars
& Altman, 1983; Shlapentok, 1989; Grancelli, 1993; Peng, 1994).
It is interesting that the idea of central planning was developed as a
counterreaction against what was seen as the basic weaknesses of the
capitalist economy - the tendency to have a permanent supply
disequilibrium with all its negative consequences such as unemployment
and crises related to surplus production. The idea of central planning was
thus the dream of reaching equilibrium. However, there has been a critical
difference between these expectations, and what happened.
First, in the years of industrialization, the socialist system reached full
employment. This was maintained in a simple, but purely administrative
and inefficient way: the central authorities offered work places (not jobs)
until unemployment had been  eliminated. Thus, full employment only
existed according to the official statistics. Secondly, the centrally planned
economies never experienced crises in terms of surplus production.
However, they suffered from repeated shortages. Ultimately,  central
6planning replaced one type of disequilibrium with another, and the dream
has not thus come true. State socialism was not able to provide a
constructive and workable alternative to capitalism. As pointed out by
Stojanov (1992:21), the process of socialist modernization was
transformed into “an active negation of the significant other [capitalist
order], into a destruction of the structural pattern of capitalist
modernization which is the particular mark of the integration of that
society being striven for”.
3. The political situation
Economic reforms in Bulgaria have been heavily politicized. As stated by
Rock (1994:20), “Without a political understanding of the reform process,
some changes would appear economically illogical, or even irrational.
There appear many easier, probably more effective, mechanisms to
achieve certain economic goals, but not, however, if one seeks to achieve
economic changes and political retribution” (emphasis added). The
following section gives a general picture of the political development in
Bulgaria of the last few years.
Formal and representative state power are concentrated in the presidential
institution in Bulgaria. The first free presidential elections in Bulgaria took
place in 1992.5 Leader of the UDF (Union of Democratic Forces, the non-
communist opposition) was Zhelyu Zhelev at that time. Being one of
communist Bulgaria’s few dissidents, he was elected president in 1992. In
late October 1996, the first round of the second direct presidential
elections took place. There were 13 candidates competing. In the second
round in November, 1996, the candidate for the UDF Peter Stojanov won
by a close to 20% margin over the socialist candidate, replacing Zhelyu
Zhelev. The vote demonstrated the disappointment and disapproval of the
Bulgarians with the way the country had been governed. This was the
poorest poll since 1990 - about 60% of the eligible voters turned out on
                                                 
5 21 pairs of bidders for the presidency competed in the first direct presidential elections held in 1992.
7election day compared with the 1992 elections in which more than 75%
took part. The newly elected president Stojanov, a relative political
newcomer, took over in late January 1997.
Bulgarian politics is a complicated affair.6 The political development of the
last six years has been dominated by the bi-polar model - the Socialist
Party and the Democratic opposition occupied the political stage of the
country. The instability of the country is closely connected to the complete
lack of continuity and consensus on essential questions, such as what
should be done, who should do it, and how it should be done. The fight
between the political groupings is tough and often destructive. Political
competition is often understood as confrontation. Bulgaria has had some of
the most unstable governments in the region. With the recent introduction
of parliamentary democracy, the country has had seven governments in the
period from 1990 to early 1997, five of which have been controlled by the
Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP), (Table 1). None of the governments have
been able to work out a mature and powerful policy program to govern the
country through the difficult and painful transition process. Demagogy and
political games have prevailed and created a very negative image of the
ruling political elite.
Time period Prime minister Government controlled by
June 1990 - Nov. 1990Andrej LukanovBSP
Dec. 1990 - Oct. 1991Dimitar Popov BSP + UDF
Nov. 1991 - Oct. 1992Filip Dimitrov UDF
Nov. 1992 - Sept. 1994Ljuben Berov BSP and MRF 7
Oct. 1994 - Dec. 1994Reneta Injova caretaker government
Jan. 1995 - Dec. 1996Zhan Videnov BSP
Since January 1997 Stefan Sofianskicaretaker government
Table 1: Overview of the governmental changes since 1990
                                                 
6 Appendix 1 looks into the party-political reality in Bulgaria until 1990
7 Movement of Rights and Freedoms, most of the members of which are people belonging to the
Turkish ethnic minority in Bulgaria.
8The BSP won the elections in June 1990, and Andrej Lukanov who was later gunned
down in October 1996 was head of the government. The UDF8 refused to participate
as a coalition partner under the leadership of BSP. Under the pressure and as a result
of demonstrations and strikes, BSP was forced to resign from power at the end of the
same year. A transitional coalition government consisting of socialists and members of
the UDF was formed in December 1990. It was led by the politically independent
Dimitar Popov, and its office term was scheduled for one year until the next elections
were to take place.
In October 1991, parliamentary elections were held and won by the UDF won slightly
margin ahead of the BSP. The UDF then formed a government supported by the MRF.
The UDF leader Filip Dimitrov became prime minister in November 1991. In June
1992, a major government “reshuffle” announced. Some months later, in October
1992, after the MRF withdrew its support of the UDF, the government resigned before
its term in office had expired. The “government of technocrats and experts” led by the
independent Ljuben Berov took over. This government was supported by the BSP, the
MRF, and some other minor parties and groupings. In September 1994, Berov’s
government resigned because the mandate given to it by the parliament ran out. The
president officially authorized the opposition to form a UDF government. The
opposition coalition rejected to form a government within the existing parliament.
Reneta Indjova took office as a prime minister, forming a caretaker government until
the next elections were to be held.
The BSP won the 1994 parliamentary elections and in January 1995, the country’s
socialists returned to power. On the one hand, this was a reaction of disappointment
on behalf of the electorate. On the other hand, the population was looking for more
stability at the cost of resisting radical changes still believing that the transition period
could be less painful and faster than expected. The three-party Democratic Left
coalition (BSP, left-wing agrarians, and ecologists) gained a majority in the National
Assembly, and a Socialist government headed by Zhan Videnov was established. The
prospects and hopes associated with the new government were rather optimistic in the
beginning of this government’s term in office. Two main considerations contributed to
the optimism of the Left at that time - the relative unity in the Socialist Party and the
                                                 
8 The UDF was set up in late 1989 shortly after ex-communist leader Todor Zhivkov was ousted from
power. The Union was formed as a coalition of informal organizations established already at the time
of the communist regime. Currently there are 17 parties and organizations in the Union. The UDF is
the main formation within the united opposition. The other two formations are Moser’s Bulgarian
Agrarian National Union and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
9absolute Socialist majority of 125 seats (43,5% of the total number of seats) in the
parliament.9
About one year later, the picture had dramatically changed - the economic situation in
the country had become much worse than it had been in the previous years. No
substantial reforms had been undertaken, and the Socialist party became fragmented
and was exposed to heavy criticisms. Mr. Videnov’s authority was strongly
undermined, and his policy was flawed. A plenum of the BSP supported the
government in November 1996 although a confidence vote showed that the actual
support was very limited (87 for and 69 against Videnov). In the end of December
1996, after an extraordinary (held two years ahead of schedule) congress of the BSP,
this socialist government stepped down. The resignation was passed at an
extraordinary session of the parliament December 29, 1996. Following the
constitution, the president allowed the Socialist party to form a new government. The
forty days of mass demonstrations which required a caretaker government headed the
opposition and new parliamentary elections in 1997 instead of 1998 showed that the
situation in the country was extremely difficult and explosive. The decision to follow
the president’s advise and not accept the mandate was taken on an individual basis by
the person who was appointed to be the next socialist prime minister. The decision was
not taken by the Socialist party as such. A new UDF caretaker government came into
office in January 1997 and will be in power until the elections have taken place in April
1997.
The transition period has consequently been very difficult from a political point of
view. At least three problematic issues are worth mentioning in the context.
One is that the political parties in the Parliament do not agree on the kind of reform
that is needed. The second problem is a logical consequence of the first one and shared
by all the various political parties. How can public support be gathered behind the
reforms? As such, attempts at achieving national consensus on how to introduce the
market economy and what strategies to adopt have failed. The third issue has to with
the fact that political decisions in Bulgaria have been highly influenced by the advice of
foreign institutions and experts. Although these have provided a way to transfer
knowledge and expertise, they have often been contradictory in their nature  and
                                                 
9  The rest of the seats was distributed as following:
    69 seats (24.23%) for the UDF;
    18 seats (6.51%) for the People’s Union Coalition;
    15 seats (5.44%) for the MRF;
10
inappropriate for the Bulgarian specificity. In this sense, the imitation of models and
strategies implemented in other countries has not worked very well and often had
drastic and negative consequences in both economic and social matters. However, it
might also be argued that in the recent situation, exactly the non-following of the
requirements of the international economic institutions (World Bank, IMF) or at least
the lack of consistency in the relationship with them, has led to the deep crisis in the
country (see especially Section 6).
The fact that a single person could occupy both the position as party leader and prime
minister has not turned out to work very well under the conditions prevailing in the
complicated transition process.10 Bulgaria’s political development in the last few years
has proved that there has been not been sufficient respect for the formal positions and
that full identification between the positions and the person occupying the positions
has predominated (see Kristeva, 1991). Consequently, it would be more appropriate to
keep politically influential positions separate.
4. Stabilization
After the start of the transition, the economy of the country is no l nger coordinated
by central planning mechanism, but matured market forces have not developed to act
as its alternative. There are no strong forces able to make the dramatic transformation
down to the road of market-driven mechanisms possible. This state of vacuum is
certainly not a favorable ground for introducing and developing a successful market
economy. Several points should be kept in mind when evaluating the present economic
situation. First, as in the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria was
hit hard by the break-down of the Comecon trading bloc known because of its
distorted trade structures unrelated to comparative advantages. The loss of ex-socialist
markets led to a deep crisis in the production systems of all the ex-socialist countries,
but in Bulgaria this was even more clear, because the country has been very depend t
upon the former USSR. 75% of Bulgaria’s trade was with the CMEA countries, and
55-60% of this was with the USSR (Dobrinsky et al., 1995:213).
1990 was a turbulent year in political terms, but there was not much done in order to
progress economically. Gradualist reforms were on the agenda, but the results were far
from satisfying. The gross foreign debt reached 10 billion USD although it was high
already before the start of the transition. It mainly accumulated in the period between
                                                                                                                                
    13 seats (4.73%) for the Bulgarian Business Bloc.
10 At the extraordinary congress of the BSP in late December 1996, these two positions became
separated by electing a new chairman of the party.
11
1986 and 1989. Following Dobrinsky et al. (1995:214), one of the main reasons for the
rapid growth of the foreign debt was the deterioration in the terms of trade after 1984,
following the decline in the world price on oil (oil products based on Soviet oil were a
substantial share in Bulgarian convertible currency exports). On the other hand, the
ruling elite was reluctant to give up ambitious and prestigious investment projects. The
result was an increasing deficit on the trade balance which was financed through heavy
international borrowing from foreign commercial banks.
The foreign debt became one of the most problematic issues in Bulgaria’s transition.
By the end of 1992, the foreign debt had reached 12.95 billion USD, which was 152%
of the GDP and 296% of export revenues (News Bulletin of the Bulgarian National
Bank, 1992, 9). In 1995, the debt reached 11.9 billion USD, out of which 2 billion
USD were held by official creditors. In March 1990, a moratorium on repayment of
the foreign debt was declared. This measure meant that Bulgaria became financially
isolated which had a highly negative impact on foreign investors’ confidence in
Bulgaria’s creditworthiness. In 1995, the gross foreign exchange reserve of the
Bulgarian National Bank increased with 383 million USD from 899 million USD to
1,282 million USD - the highest number during the last few years. The number varied
depending on the time of the foreign debt service payments. In January 1996,
Bulgarian foreign debt Brady bonds registered record high levels on the international
debts instruments market.
The foreign trade broke down and the industrial output fell by nearly 40% during 1990
alone. 1991 was marked by the announcement of shock therapy. The years starting
from 1991 could however be better described as “shock without therapy”, to use
Kolodko’s (1996:12) terminology. GDP declined substantially for four years and
increased for the first time in 1994.
The stabilization program was launched in Bulgaria in February 1991 - the year when
some of the most significant changes took place in the country. The program was
coordinated by the International Monetary Fund and included restructuring of state-
owned enterprises, liberalization of the prices, of foreign trade, of interest rates, and
the establishing of a floating exchange rate. In 1991-1992, a number of new laws w e
passed and implemented such as the Commercial Law, the Law on Foreign Investment,
Restitution Laws, the Privatization Law, the Law on Bulgarian National Bank, and the
New Labor Code.
12
The tax system is inefficient and inequitable. The demand that everyone liable to
taxation should pay up does not function. A tax reform was introduced in 1991 and in
1993, the Tax Administration Act was passed. In February 1996, the parliament passed
additions and revisions to the 1993 Act which were returned for re-consideration by
the president. The amended Act makes the establishment of a national service on the
prevention and detection of tax evasion possible. However, creating the legal taxation
framework is not enough to increase the efficiency of tax collection. The Treasury’s
approach to tax debtors is far not harsh at all, and there are no proper institutions to
deal with these matters. Corruption in those institutions that are supposed to take care
of these issues are already  widespread.
Part of the stabilization program of 1991 was the introduction of a floating exchange
rate and making the Bulgarian currency internally convertible. For first time,
Bulgarians were granted the right to possess foreign currency accounts in Bulgarian
commercial banks. Export companies were allowed to keep their foreign exchange
earnings in foreign exchange deposits, and import companies obtained the right to
purchase foreign exchange from commercial banks in the amounts they needed.
Another stabilization measure was the introduction of credit ceilings. The purpose of
this measure was better control with the money supply. The various commercial banks
had the right to individually determine the credit ceilings, and if the respective bank
exceeded the limits to the commercial loans, it had to respond to higher reserve
requirements.
In the period 1993-1994, there was not much stabilization measures implemented
stabilization, especially because of the political instability in the country. The Bulgarian
currency collapsed, and the exchange rate crisis extended. In 1995, Bulgaria
experienced some progress in terms of macro-economic stabilization. The best
macroeconomic indicators in five years gave reason for optimism. The country
experienced economic growth, a slowdown in inflation,. and a substantial trade
surplus. GDP grew by 2.6% in 1995, totaling 852,000 million leva. However,
throughout 1995, Bulgaria failed to reach the fourth standby agreement with the
IMF,11 the major obstacles being the crisis in the banking system and lack of tangible
steps towards implementing structural reform. Table 2 lists the key indicators
characterizing the economic situation in the country in the period 1994-1996:
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Key indicators 1994 1995 1996*
GDP (%) 1.8 2.6 -9.0
Inflation % 96.3 62.0 220.0
Industrial production (%) 7.8 8.6 -12.0
Unemployment (%) 12.8 10.5 10.4
Exports ($m) 3,935 5,110 4,500
Imports ($m) 3,952 4,683 4,000
Current account balance ($m) 203.0 281.0 300
Budget balance (% of GDP) -5.8 -5.7 -8.9
Gross debt ($ billion) 10.3 9.4 9.5
Sources: JP Morgan, EIU, WIIW,
EBRD   * projection
Table 2: Key economic indicators in the period 1994-1996
Source: Business Central Europe, December 1996, p. 41
As the table shows, the economic progress of 1995 was not sustained in 1996. The
governments’ objectives of lowering inflation while sustaining economic growth were
not realized, and the country went into a grave economic recession. GDP declined
considerably. The foreign debt to the London Club, the IMF, the World Bank, and the
EU-countries surpassed 1,34 billion USD and a sizable share of the budget (52% in the
first half of 1996) went to service external and internal debt. Some 900 million USD
were paid on the foreign debt in 1995, and more than 1,000 million USD by the end of
1996.
Ceilings on the annual percentage increase in the wage bill of state enterprises have
been imposed by the government since 1991. In 1990, the government, CITUB (the
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria) and the National Employers’
Union signed an agreement, setting up a tripartite commission for the coordination of
the different and often conflicting interests.12 One of the concrete tasks of the
commission has been to negotiate the wage policy and liberalization in order to prevent
heavy social contradictions (CITUB, 1993). Wages in the country do not keep pace
with inflation although a regular wage indexation in the public sector takes place
compensating for a certain percentage of the price increases. In 1995, the average
public sector worker in Bulgarian earned about 103 USD a month. In the period 1992-
1995, wages increased by an average of 7.6% per annum, in USD. It is worth
                                                                                                                                
11 This agreement is connected with extending of the FESAL loan by the World Bank that has been
negotiated for more than three years.
12 Regarding the labor relations and unions’ participation in the economic reform in Bulgaria see
Dittrich & Haferkemper, 1995
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mentioning that wages and salaries, excluding the wage component in self-employment
income and royalties, make up nearly half of average household income in Bulgaria
(see Hassan & Peters, 1996:632).
The Bulgarian currency remained extremely weak. In the first two months of 1996, the
Bulgarian lev depreciated by 8%. In the previous year of 1995, it had taken twelve
months for the lev to depreciate by the same margin. The country’s very limited hard
currency reserves and the difficulties in servicing the external debt are part of the
reasons behind the national currency crisis. The Bulgarian lev depreciated by 600%
against the USD in 1996. The exchange rate started from leva 75 to the USD in April
1996 and reached Leva 313 in November 1996. In December 1996, the lev was traded
at 500 to the USD (the government’s ambition was to keep at the level of 150 leva for
1996) and in January 1997, the USD was sold and bought on the cash and inter-bank
market at 910/960 leva and 950/1,000 leva respectively. This tendency was gaining in
strength, and projections included a 10% depreciation of the national currency per day.
In February 1997, the USD reached the record-high levels of 3,000 leva. As the
second half of 1996 demonstrated, keeping high interest rates for deposits in national
currency is only a short-term measure which cannot really influence the exchange rate
dynamics. Additionally, the high rates impose a barrier to economic and investment
activities.
In early November 1996, IMF officials proposed to introduce a currency board in
Bulgaria to take over the monetary policy and apply strict rules to its implementation.
Under the currency board, the commitment to a fixed exchange rate would be enforced
by the full backing of domestic currency with foreign currency reserves. The currency
board is an extreme measure which is considered to limit the country’s room for
maneuver. At the same time, the currency board seems to be the last resort for the
country’s stabilization and therefore one of the very few options as a way out of the
current deep crisis. The tasks of the board would be to reduce inflation, keep the
exchange rate at a certain level, and restore the confidence in the national currency.
The introduction of a currency board is less risky than the high interest rates and the
monetary and budget restrictions and does not necessarily require special legislation.
However, there are at least three significant premises for the successful functioning of
the board. First, there has to be full consensus amongst all major political forces about
the need for such a board. Secondly, it has to be supported by wide public confidence
(which is closely associated with confidence in the IMF) and third that the foreign
15
exchange reserves of the country and the financial resources exceeding the external
debt payment are sufficiently supported by the IMF.
5. Liberalization
The legal system is a significant part of the environment in which economic activities
fail or succeed. The legislation in Bulgaria does not provide consistency and clarity. It
does not serve as a technical basis to sustain the reform. By distinguishing between
passing laws/acts and implementing/enforcing them, on could say that the inefficiency
of the legal rules in Bulgaria is not related to the fact that there are not enough
laws/acts, because rather that these are poorly administered or implemented. Actually,
the legal framework is well developed, “not discriminating between domestic and
foreign investors and imposing few constraints on creating a range of investment
vehicles and security instruments” and whereas the implementation/administration of
these is “reasonably well administrated and supported judicially, although that support
is sometimes patchy” (EBRD Transition Report, 1996:14).
Price liberalization started in 1990. The prices of the consumer goods increased by
over 400% in 1991. By the end of 1992, 16% of the prices of all goods were
controlled. From the beginning of the price liberalization until January 1997, the prices
has increased with 30,595% (or 306 times). Many of the prices (46% in 1995) remain
under the administrative control of the state. The Price Law (passed in 1995) allows
the government to introduce further price controls at its discretion. Post and
telecommunications, energy products, and tobacco products have fixed prices.
Recently, certain formulas have been introduced to adjust the centrally administered
prices of telecommunication services, the railway system, and urban transport, fuel,
electricity, and heating to cost-recovery levels.
The situation within the banking system is highly unstable. The terms “banking mafia”
and “credit millionaires” are widely used in the country. In 1991, the number of the
state-owned banks was 73. The first private bank in Bulgaria (First Private Bank) was
founded in 1990. The number of private banks reached 23 by the end of 1994 but
dropped to 19 in 1995 (total assets of the private banks comprised about 16% of the
total Bulgarian bank assets). In the beginning of 1995, 45 state-owned and private
banks operated in the country. Their current losses are of the order of 4-6% of the
GDP, and the aggregate negative capital of the banking system is 11-12% of the
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GDP.13 The Bulgarian banking system comprises more than 12 branches and
subsidiaries of foreign and jointly established banks.
There is a national bank in Bulgaria called the State Saving Bank (SSB). The SSB is
considered a leading financial and lending institution - it has between 60 and 70% of
the national bank market. The SSB is mostly attractive to small depositors, but their
confidence in this bank has also been shook - citizens started withdrawing their savings
from this institution too. 600-800 million USD were drained out of the entire banking
system in the country. The main concern is that the SSB refinanced several cash-
strapped commercial banks, some of which face liquidation.
In March 1996, the government approved a bank rehabilitation and restructuring
program. ZUNK bonds (internal government debt bonds or bad-debt bonds) worth 400
million USD were issued to initiate the process. The program included the following
measures:
1) a consolidation of banks through mergers with majority state interest and banks
with different form of ownership.14 The consolidation had to be completed by
January 1996 by the Bank Consolidation Company. The latter was established in
1992 and became the sole holder of all public shares in the commercial banks;
2) restructuring and privatization of some of the banks through the sale to local and
foreign investors of the share packages held by the Bank Consolidation Company;
3) declaring insolvent and liquidating loss-making commercial banks, as well as
compulsory floating of shares of inefficient and loss-making banks.
The financial situation of many Bulgarian commercial banks deteriorated and in 1996,
the banking system has self-destructed in a disruptive liquidity crisis. It has become
obvious that the banking sector cannot serve as an environment for private and
institutional savings. In the last few years, instead of providing stabilizing measures for
economic activity, the commercial banking system concentrated much more on short-
term activities and extending bad loans to loss-making enterprises. The introduction of
a scheme guaranteeing deposits prior to the final adjustment of this sector is seen by
IMF’s experts as the main mistake. Another factor that has contributed to the deep
crisis is the excessively high costs the private and state-owned banks in Bulgaria have.
                                                 
13 The numbers are from the document “Macroeconomic Aspects of the Restructuring Program”
drawn up by experts of the Economic Development Ministry, cited in Weekly News Bulletin, October
11, 1996.
14 Seven mergers of banks were effected by December 1995.
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Additional factors for the current urgent situation in the banking sector are the lack of
financial discipline and non-appropriate behavior.
The mobilization of the banking system is a premise for an effective allocation of
domestic savings. It is to a great extent connected with the structural adjustment of the
public sector and increasing the pace of privatization. However, it is difficult to achieve
concrete positive results in the banking reform after the confidence in the banking
system was completely lost and after Bulgarians used their lev deposits to buy hard
currency.
In May 1996, the Bulgarian government passed a bank bankruptcy law which was the
main prerequisite for the implementation of the three bank restructuring steps listed
above. The Deposits Protection Act was also adopted in May 1996. In September
1996, nine banks were closed. This, besides all other effects, caused problems for the
buyers in the privatization deals. The Deposits Protection Act was amended in October
1996 and concerned about 800,000 depositors who had money in these nine banks.
Following the act, personal deposits were guaranteed 100% and those of companies
and legal persons only 50%. The withdrawal of deposits gave citizens 30 days and
companies and legal persons 60 days after the bankruptcy decision.
There is no national capital market operating in Bulgaria although it is in a process of
being establishing. Two stock exchanges came into existence in early 1992. Their
number increased to 40 in 1995. The Bulgarian stock exchange was created as a
consortium of several regional stock exchanges. It needs to be modernized and its
operations improved so that portfolio investments can increase.15 The unsatisfactory
state of the stock exchange is linked to the delay in the mass privatization program and
the loss of confidence in the capital market due to the so-called financial pyramid
games. As recently as in 1995, around 150,000 Bulgarians lost their savings in such
financial scams mainly because of loopholes in the legal framework and overconfidence
on part of the investors. The recovery of the capital exchange is associated with
launching cash privatization using the exchange and the appearance of the shares
acquired in the process of mass privatization on the market (see Section 6.3 on
privatization process).
                                                 
15 Throughout 1995, the stock exchanges in Bulgaria showed an aggregate turnover of only 6 million




While privatization became an issue of importance in the late 1970s in the West, it is a
relatively new phenomenon in the former socialist countries. Privatization is considered
to be one of the fundamental tenets of transition economics and crucial to the
attainment of a market-based economy. Its primary objective is “to subject enterprise
managers to pressure from owners that have a direct economic interest in the financial
performance of the companies” (EBRD Transition report, 1996:10). It is assumed that
privatization is the core process in institutional and enterprise restructuring in Central
and Eastern Europe, it improves corporate governance and increases productivity as a
whole.
The “classical efficiency argument” for private ownership assumes that the assets will
also generate the highest discounted present value of net returns from a societal point
of view when assets are owned and controlled by those individuals in the society who
value them the most highly (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 1996:1173). As a part of the
broader process of establishing autonomous profit-oriented and competitive economic
units privatization is a pre-requisite for remodeling the economic environment in the
countries in transition.
Income from the transfer of ownership may cover part of the lack of financial
resources both on the government budget and in the reserve of the Central Bank
(which was the case in Bulgaria in 1996). Privatization is one of the auspicious
methods for recapitalization of the banking sector. Additionally, income from the
privatization process may finance budget deficits to a great extent. In Bulgaria,
revenue generated by privatizing state-owned companies goes to finance the largest
part of the budget deficit in 1997. The grave economic crisis in Bulgaria meant that
increasing the speed of the privatization process was given higher priority than proper
enterprise valuation. Privatization is also necessary in the process of attracting foreign
direct investment and thus foreign currency to Bulgaria. In the current economic
climate, Bulgaria needs as much foreign currency as possible.
6.1 The State of Privatization
Bulgaria is not among the countries in an advanced state of transition, especially
because of the slow pace of the privatization process. One of the specific and clearly
expressed features of the economic development and the  privatization process in
Bulgaria is that it has been linked to strong political considerations. According to Rock
(1994:20), the Bulgarian privatization process is “the outcome of continuing political
struggles. It has taken place in the context of a revolutionary change in political power
in which antagonisms have deep roots and where many politicians appear more
focused on self-vindication, on just punishments of past collaborators in totalitarianism,
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or on outright revenge.” The privatization process was a part of the political programs
of all governments that have ruled the country in the last few years. Three
governments declared themselves “governments of privatization”. However, concrete
positive results still lack. The two poles at the political stage, the Bulgarian Socialist
Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (the non-communist formation,
UDF), agree on the need for privatization as a tangible step toward a dynamic and
modern market-based economy. However, the concrete way in which the private
sector should be developed is still a matter of dispute.
When economic reform began in 1991, the private sector share of GDP was 6.4%. As
illustrated in Figure 1, this share increased steadily. In 1995, the output of the private
sector rose by more than 25% compared to 1994 and made up about one-third of the
Bulgarian GDP. Private entrepreneurs were most active in the food processing industry
where production rose by 45%. This sector was ahead of mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering, and electronics, that had a 23% growth rate. The share of the
private sector in the Bulgarian GDP is nudging 50% at present. This is a positive
indicator in the pessimistic picture of the entire economic situation.












1992 1993 1994 1995
Source: National Statistical Institute, quoted in Bulgaria: The Investment
Opportunities, Privatization Agency Bulletin, 1996:2
It is hard to estimate the exact contribution of new private companies, state-owned
enterprises being privatized and foreign investment in the growth of the private sector.
The proportion of these factors varies over time. For example, because of the delay of
the enactment of the Privatization Law and the lack of real interest of several
Bulgarian governments to privatize, growth in the private sector was rather limited
until 1995-1996 and somewhat bigger in 1996. Statistics concerning the number of
people employed in the private sector are different and often contradictory (see
Frydman et al., 1993:23), mainly because of inconsistency in the recording of numbers.
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It should be mentioned that it is not very clear how the development of the private
sector is going to be influenced by the recent crisis in the banking system.
With fast changing governments, nobody has really had sufficient time to implement
the announced promises and make privatization a central element in the transformation
process. Because of this lack of continuity and missing consensus regarding economic
reform, the privatization process was considerably delayed. Additionally, most of the
big and profitable deals were prevented from being closed for several months,
including those that were just about to be signed.
6.2 The legal framework for privatization
The legal framework for privatization in Bulgaria was drawn up before the
privatization process began. The Privatization Law (the Transformation and
Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Act) wa  passed in April 1992. The
law concerned only market (capital) privatization by introducing techniques such as
open-tenders, auctions, management buy-outs, etc. The Privatization Funds Act and
the Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment Companies Act are the two other
significant instruments that form the legal framework for the privatization process in
Bulgaria. The restitution of real estate and enterprises expropriated in the past was
legally regulated by the Restitution of Immovable Property Act passed in 1992.
At present, enterprises in specific sectors such as water supply, sea ports, railway
transport, extraction of minerals, and mining are not subject to privatization. In July
1993, the Parliament imposed a three-year moratorium on the privatization of
enterprises of the military-industrial complex which expired in July 1996. In September
1996, the then government’s program for increasing the speed of privatization included
the sell-off of 62 out of 86 enterprises in the defense industry.16
The country’s legislation provides preferential treatment to employees in cash and
mass privatization. In cash privatization, the eligible staff will acquire up to 20% of the
government-owned assets of an enterprise paying 50% of the purchasing price of each
share. In the mass privatization program, the eligible staff will acquire 10% of the
assets to be privatized by vouchers free of charge. These free shares shall be acquired
off the voucher book. The legal framework allows foreign creditors to participate in
the privatization through payment of up to 50% of the negotiated price with Brady
                                                 
16 Until 1989, Bulgaria used to earn 900 million USD and 2,500 million transferable rubles annually
from arms and materiel sales. These earnings barely added up to 50 million USD in 1991-1992. The
Bulgarian military complex recovered to a certain extent in 1994-1995, selling 390 million USD’
worth of weapons and military equipment. The projections for 1996 were for a profit of some 450
million USD (BTA weekly news bulletin, October 22, 1996)
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bonds (municipal enterprises are sold for cash only). There are no liabilities for paying
interest envisaged in the budget and the use of Brady bonds therefore decreases the
pressure on the budget. That is why this way of paying is not preferred by the National
Privatization Agency. The issued “Bradies” have a maturity of 25 years with a 5-year
grace period. Another alternative to cash payments in the privatization deals are the
ZUNK bonds (internal government debt bonds or bad-debt bonds). Since late 1994,
when the regulations to govern the debt swaps in privatization were adopted, the
major deals were paid by external and internal debt bonds.
In 1996, the National Privatization Agency introduced significant tax incentives for
domestic and foreign investors in enterprises where over 66% of the assets are
privatized. Privatization investors can obtain a discount on the purchasing price, going
all the way up to about 30%. Another key incentive offers privatization investors a
“tax holiday” - 100% relief for the first three years after the acquisition and 50% relief
for the subsequent two years.
6.3 Institutions involved in privatization
The state authority which organizes and supervises market privatization in the state
sector is the National Privatization Agency (NPA). It draws up the annual privatization
program and its annual report. The NPA is financed on the government budget. Its
head office is located in Sofia and regional offices are all over the country. The NPA
carries out the privatization of state enterprises with book value of long-term assets of
more than USD 1 million.
The municipal privatization is carried out by the municipal councils. 6 ministries and 4
committees with ministerial status have the right to privatize smaller enterprises. The
Center for Mass Privatization ogether with the Council of Ministers take care of
privatization through investment bonds. The Government and the Parliament approve
the programs for cash and mass privatization. The responsibilities of the different
institutions involved in the privatization process are clearly demarcated. However,
sometimes their coordination efforts fail because of the incompatibility of legal rules.
More than 120 privatization funds were established to act as financial intermediaries in
the mass privatization program (the figures projected by experts were between 30 and
50 funds)17 where small shareholders can invest their shares. The establishment of the
funds is not a result of the restructuring of state enterprises. Their functioning is
associated with the second stage of the process of mass privatization. Public
organizations, state-owned and private companies, trade unions, and political parties
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meeting all legal and financial requirements are allowed to establish their own
privatization funds.
The decisions for licensing the privatization funds are taken by the Commission on
Securities and Stock Exchanges. 92 out of the 120 investment funds have been
licensed to carry on business in a privatization-fund capacity. 11 of them failed to
collect enough vouchers. The 81 funds are expected to be among the key players in the
mass privatization process. With 2.8 million shares, the Doverie Privatization Fund has
acquired the largest number of shares among the privatization funds. It is followed by
Petrol - 2.4 million shares and Moultigroup - 2.3 million. The Doverie Fund has also
acquired shares in the largest number of enterprises, 90, followed by the Bulgarian-
Dutch Privatization Fund18- 74 and some others.
6.4 The privatization process
Transferring formerly state-owned enterprises into private hands is a part of the entire
reform picture. It has been one of the most pressing issues in Bulgaria, and at the same
time the process has been considerably slowed down. According to government plans,
privatization was supposed to start in 1991. In reality, the first step in the privatization
process was considerably delayed.19 As mentioned above, the privatization law was
passed in April 1992, and the NPA was established in the autumn of 1992. Restitution,
cash privatization, worker-manager buy-out, mass privatization, and municipal
privatization are the instruments of denationalization in the country (see the sections
below). Although there has been recent progress made in the cash and especially mass
privatization programs, the process of transferring ownership is rather slow in general.
The first stage of denationalization of the Bulgarian economy involved the cash
privatization launched in 1993. The initiation of the auctions of the mass privatization
in 1996 started the second stage of the process.
The success of the privatization process depends to a great extent on the transparency
of the information related to it. Rules for advertising the participation conditions and
procedures should be made known as broadly as possible, and they have to deal fairly
with all participants. The participation needs to be more active in order to create real
                                                                                                                                
17 The number of privatization funds in Bulgaria is considerably smaller than in the Czech Republic
(450) and Russia (600).
18 The Bulgarian-Dutch privatization fund was set up by Bulgaria’s Post Bank and the ING Bank of
the Netherlands. Altogether, 15 of the funds have foreign participation.
19 The so-called “wild” (or “quiet”) privatization started already in 1990 when experienced managers
in state-owned companies transferred assets to their owned businesses at very low prices. The so-
called “small privatization” started in 1991 by selling small enterprises through open, publicly
announced auctions or through a tendering process (see Rock, 1994:22-26).
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possibilities to sell the enterprises for the best price. People need to believe that
companies are sold fairly, impartially, and highly priced.
6.4.1. Restitution
The restitution process restores the property right on real estate that was nationalized
in the period 1946-1962 by the totalitarian regime. Until October 1996, around 87% of
all municipal and state-owned entities that went into private hands were privatized
through restitution (22,000 out of 25,300). Restitution claims are met by part of the
government assets in the cash and mass privatization processes.
Land restitution proved very complex and costly and was hindered both by legal and
financial problems. The process of handing over land ownership did not yield the
expected results. About 60% of the land was returned to its owners, 20% is still
pending restitution, and the technical procedures about another 20% have not yet
started. The majority of the privatized farms are tiny (averaging only 1.2 hectares),
most of the existing machinery is designed for large-scale farming, and 45% of the
farmers do not intend to farm their plots themselves. Following Wyzan (1993), “the
result has been a resurgence of producer-type cooperatives of various types, which
may not prove to be viable in competing on the world market; indeed, they may not
even be able to compete against imports on the domestic market” (cited in Miller,
1995:68).
6.4.2. Cash privatization
Cash privatization requires legal analysis and evaluation based on current market
prices. Therefore, the costs for conducting an evaluation for cash privatization is
considerably higher compared with this for mass privatization. The evaluation differs
from case to case which delays the privatization procedure.
The first privatization deal in Bulgaria was completed on May 12, 1993 when the
Belgian company Amylum bought 81% of the shares of the Bulgarian maize processing
plant “Tzarevichni Producti”-Razgrad. Privatization in 1993-1995 did not accelerate as
expected. In December 1995, the then Bulgarian government approved a list of about
70 enterprises to be privatized. This number is part of a total of 467 companies of its
1996 market privatization program. Poor coordination between the responsible
ministries and the NPA kept down the pace of cash privatization. The cash
privatization program was unrealistic, involving heavy bureaucratic procedures and
was not completed. Additionally, no large enterprises were put on the list for cash
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privatization. The requirement of the World Bank towards Bulgaria for 1996 was cash
privatization of a minimum of 5% of the long-term tangible assets of state-owned
companies.
The push in the cash privatization process in 1996 was caused by the urgent economic
situation in the country, a deep crisis in the banking system, disappointing  economic
indicators, and large amounts of money not being circulated. The lack of money was
by large covered by revenue from cash privatization. The list of the so-called
accelerated privatization was made, and the procedure for cash privatization for some
of the enterprises on the mass privatization list was approved in October 1996.
The results of cash privatization during the last four years is not positive measured on
the basis of the decisions taken for opening procedures, the number of deals, and the
amount of financial income generated. However, most of the deals concerned the
privatization of detached enterprise units and did therefore not really influence
ownership restructuring.
6.4.3. Management-employee buy-outs
As far as insider privatization is concerned, we should bear in mind that although it
favors the employees to a greater extent than any other type of privatization, it is
mainly the managers that gain and exercise control over the privatized firms. An
important factor in this process is “the degree the formal and de facto ownership rights
have been given to the employees both in the period prior to the revolutionary change
and in the transitional period before privatization is implemented” (Mygind, 1995:200).
Before 1989, employees in Bulgarian companies formally had certain rights. In fact,
they were relatively limited or not sufficiently used by the workers, and the actual
rights were in the hands of the enterprise managers. Around 1988, the Bulgarian
Communist Party initiated “workers’ self-management” and the act of “transmitting
ownership from the state to the people working with and managing it” was initiated.
However, this was a purely administrative act and had nothing to do with ownership
transformation, increasing the influence of employees. The enterprises remained state-
owned. At that time, the idea of changing their legal status was too far from economic
and legal reality.
When the economy is too centralized, decisions concerning what and how much to
produce as well as what and how to sell was not up to the individual enterprises and
their managers. Instead, they were taken by state bureaucrats and Communist Party
officials in the respective municipalities and in the case of enterprises of strategic
significance - under the supervision of the central party-political institutions. The party
apparatus had more rights than any other group. Even internal tasks and processes
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were subject to confirmation from above. Being faced with the dilemma “where they
want to go and where they feel they can go” (Graves, 1986:155), managers in socialist
enterprises were limited to a great extent in their decision-making and ability to act.
By the end of 1989, the change of the political system became a key challenge for
Bulgarian companies, influencing their staff and management directly and tangibly. The
business environment had changed dramatically and influenced the economic entities
forcing them to operate as market actors. At the same time, the effects of  stability and
stagnation in the period prior to early 1990s created a climate of social distance, of
anonymity, and organizational apathy. Therefore, the lack of motivation for change
from the part of both employees and managers was not surprising. At a later stage, the
management teams turned out to be the “dominant coalitions” (Kanter et al., 1992),
taking initiative and participating actively in the pre-privatization and privatization
process.
No definitive conclusions concerning the participation of employees and managers can
be drawn until the various privatization funds start selling the shares they have bought.
Only after this process is at a more advanced stage, it will be clear who the real owners
will be. What can be expected is however that the forthcoming start of the mass
privatization process will stimulate part of the management-employee deals and the
sale of detached units.
By the beginning of September 1996, a total of 203 deals were concluded as worker-
manager buy-outs. About 200 enterprises are envisaged for MBOs for 1997. These are
mainly small and medium sized companies, and even bigger financial preferences
compared to the present ones are projected to be introduced for the personnel to buy
them.
6.4.4. Mass privatization
The process of mass voucher-based privatization was the preferred method for large-
scale privatization. The BSP and the international financial institutions insisted on the
implementation of the voucher-based privatization method. Even though the UDF took
a stand against this form of denationalization, the participation of the population was
highest in the cities where the opposition performed best in the local elections in
October 1995. The Mass Privatization Center was assisted and consulted by a
PHARE-European Union Consortium set up in August 1995 in legal and
organizational matters. The consortium consisted of three institutions: Credit
Commercial de France (one of the biggest banks in France), Omniul International (a
large French agency working in the field of economic and financial information and
advertising) and the British Denton Hall legal firm.
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The mass privatization scheme was passed in December 1995, and the process was
launched on January 8, 1996. The scheme envisaged that every Bulgarian above the
age of 18 is entitled to 25,000 investment leva in a voucher book. The registration fee
was 500 leva (a relative small amount of money even at that time), but students, senior
citizens, and conscripts only had to pay 100 leva for their voucher books. Orphans
received their investment books free of charge. Voucher books were available at more
than 3,000 post offices in the country. They can be transferred to relatives and
exchanged for privatization funds shares. Foreign investors were directly able to
participate in the process of mass privatization in Bulgaria through the establishment of
privatization funds.
According to the statistics of the Mass Privatization Center (BTA weekly news
bulletin, 5-11 February 1996), an average of 40% were scheduled to use investment
vouchers in the privatization process. The price of land on which the enterprises are
built and which is their property is included in these companies’ assets. By enterprise
size, the percentage of the shares set aside to be traded for investment vouchers breaks
down as follows:
· 25% for 180 large and profitable enterprises. The state will retain control over the
rest of the shares of these companies;
· 60-80% for medium-sized enterprises which comprise the majority of enterprises
scheduled for mass privatization.
· 80-90% for 355 small-sized enterprises.
The remaining shares will be used for cash privatization and meeting restitution claims.
The first centralized auction was scheduled for October 1996 involving the sale of 11%
of all state enterprise assets. 32 million shares (42% of all offered interest) were
purchased at the first session of the auction. Of the 968 enterprises offered at the first
session, the privatization funds acquired shares in 578. They have bought out 3, in 55
the individual participants controlled the funds, and 390 have been sold to individual
bidders alone. A second round will follow in 1997. The centralized auction includes
three bids each with a duration of three months. The mass privatization of 1050
enterprises is expected to generate private ownership control in 911 entities with the
government controlling a maximum of 33%.20 Six months after the last auction, the
shares of the newly privatized enterprises and of the privatization funds are freely
available on the Stock Exchange.
                                                 
20  According to World Bank criteria, enterprises with such a ownership ratio are considered private.
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Although it is stated that “Bulgaria has moved substantially ahead” with the process of
mass privatization in 1996 (EBRD Transition Report, 1996:22), it is not a big success
in terms of popular participation. Despite the massive campaign in the national media,
Bulgarians were not in a hurry to become owners of investment vouchers (wait-and-
see-approach). A month after the process started, only 4-5% of entitled citizens had
registered to take part, contrary to the expected 17%. Many waited until the last
moment to obtain their voucher books. The initial deadline for the registration expiring
on April 8, 1996 was extended. The initial expectations were that about 70% of the
population would take part in the mass privatization process. In reality, around 3
million eligible citizens signed up through privatization funds or independently out of
the 6.5 million Bulgarians that could take part.
Mass privatization in Bulgaria was called “mass privatization without the masses”.
What are the main reasons for the low interest and participation in this process?
The public had in fact no real information about the actual financial performance of the
enterprises on the list for mass privatization. The Confederation of Independent Trade
Unions in Bulgaria (one of the country’s most influential amalgamations) set up a
Labor and Property Association to exercise civil and trade union control of the process
of mass privatization. The aim of the association was to protect citizens against state
bureaucracy and pyramid financial schemes by providing them with information about
the enterprises put on the voucher privatization list and yet, the lack of essential
information was one of the main barriers for broader participation. Misleading advice
such as to invest in enterprises in the region where citizens live was another factor. The
procedure according to which citizens were to take part in the process was actually not
clear either.
The majority of the population did not believe they could profit from the mass
privatization program. The intensive media campaign tended to focus on explanations
as to why participants would not lose by participating in the mass privatization
program. Bearing in mind that the Bulgarian currency is highly devaluated, but that the
purchasing power of vouchers is high, it was cheap to participate. However, the
alienation of the population was difficult to overcome. The most active group appeared
to be the pensioners who comprise around 20% of the population.
The low participation can also be explained by the general attitude of many Bulgarians
that the state uses the mass privatization program as a way of getting rid of
unprofitable enterprises. According to the study conducted by experts of the Economy
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2000 Club,21 the 1,200 enterprises put on the list perform quite poorly. 53% of them
showed losses at the end of 1994 (BTA, Weekly News Bulletin). According to the
same source, the fixed capital of these enterprises is worth an aggregate of 90,000
million leva. However, this assessment was made in 1992, and since then it has not
been adjusted to the 300%-plus inflation. The explanation that potential investors did
not have to accept responsibility for the debts incurred by privatized enterprises did not
help a lot.
Part of the Bulgarian population was not interested in participating in the mass
privatization program, because they saw the investment of their vouchers in the
privatization funds as being similar to investing in the so-called financial pyramids. As
recent as in 1995, around 150,000 Bulgarians lost their money in such financial
schemes; mainly because of loopholes in the legal framework and overconfident
investors. Although the legal framework provides sufficient guarantees against
misappropriation in the privatization funds, it is difficult to overcome such suspicion.
Voucher privatization is the most serious privatization effort in Bulgaria so far. It is
considered as the quickest way to increase the private sector share of the economy and
to develop the secondary market in the country. One of the long-term objectives of the
mass privatization process is the creation of a normally functioning stock market.
However, mass privatization leads to little corporate governance. The low
participation means that financial value of enterprise assets which are up for mass
privatization is distributed among a smaller number of investors. Another consequence
is stronger competition among the privatization funds in terms of attracting voucher
books and profiting from the process of mass privatization. Experts projected that
some of the enterprises subject to mass privatization may be profitable in 1997, but this
is rather unlikely bearing in mind the difficult context in which they operate.
6.5. Privatization in Bulgaria - numbers and figures
The general privatization model adopted in Bulgaria combines cash payment, in most
transactions covering debts, and an obligation for additional investments in the
projects, as well as the preservation of a minimum number of working positions for a
certain period of time. By the end of 1995, the NPA had realized 13 transactions with
foreign investors worth approximately USD 356 million. Sale of state property raised
only USD 133 million compared with the planned USD 200 million (this is below the
1994 figure of USD 180 million).
                                                 
21  The survey was based on the balance sheets of the enterprises and reveals both their financial state
and the return on capital employed.
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In 1995, there were 309 privatization deals, down from the 584 target and double the
1994 figure. The highest percentage was reported in the field of agriculture (25%)
ahead of the food processing industry (14.4%) and construction (13.5%). There were
fewer deals in transport and mechanical engineering. 305 out of 309 units that went
into private hands were bought by domestic investors, and only 4 deals were signed
with foreign investors. 20 of the companies privatized in 1995 were municipal. 32
privatization sales paid in Brady bonds were finalized in 1995. An amount of USD
123,400,000 has been written off the external debt by the partial payment of
privatization sales in Brady bonds.
Figure 2 illustrates the shares of the different sectors in terms of privatization results:















Source: Bulgaria: Heart of New Markets, Privatization Agency, 1996:9
For 1996, there were 460 enterprises on the priority list. A total of 1,366 privatization
deals were closed by October 1996, with a total financial result of 78,530 million leva.
Table 1 lists the largest Bulgarian privatization deals in 1996, the year in which the
strongest privatization push was made:
Table 1: Largest Bulgarian privatization deals in 1996
Company Buyer Sector Share Price
Aroma Astera (BG) cosmetics 67% USD      9mln
Instrument Plansee (A) machine tools 75% USD      4mln
Avangard ABB (S/CH) generators 67% USD      2mln
Vitamina TKM (BG/Gk) food-canning 60% USD      0.1mln
Hemus MEBO * stationery 55% USD      3mln
Plama Euroenergy (BG) oil refinery 75% USD   310mln
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Eltos Sparky Trading (D) electric appliances55% USD       8mln
Interpred MEBO * office space 70% USD     32mln
Sheraton Daewoo (South Korea)hotel 67% USD     22mln
* Management-employee buy-out
Source: Whitford, 1996:38
The data of the NPA only appear positive if one does not take into account the harsh
devaluation of the Bulgarian currency. At the present xchange rate, the above
amounts are far from satisfactory.
7. Bulgaria in a process of restructuring: why and how, if at all
Stabilization, liberalization and privatization are all elements of the creation of a
competitive market environment which, in turn, is a prerequisite for macro economics
and enterprise restructuring. There is a serious lack of structural changes transforming
the Bulgarian economy and Bulgarian enterprises or these changes have at least not
been extensive enough - they do not adjust to the changing market environment. The
strongest evidence is that the structure of the country’s economy has remained
unchanged since 1989. At present, 52% of the state companies are making a loss.
7.1. Foreign investment as a factor for economic restructuring
Since there is a vital link between sustainable economic development and the
integration of the countries in transition into the world economy, one of the direct
factors for restructuring the economic systems is foreign investment. It plays a crucial
role in the process of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy by
changing the market structure and introducing competitive market-based interactions.
Foreign investment provides technical and financial expertise, know-how, modern
management policies, and practices as well as access to international capital markets.
Private investors concentrate on financial returns and profitability, and government
investors focus on the impact their projects will have on the scope and objectives of
the transition.
Bulgaria’s attractiveness lies mainly in the strategic geographical location of the
country (a cross-point between Western Europe and the Middle East) combined with a
relatively cheap but highly qualified and skilled labor force 22, cheap resources and tax
incentives. A main obstacle for foreign firms wishing to enter the Bulgarian market is
the shortage of hard currency. The large foreign debt (see Section 4) and the lengthy
payment delays pose significant barriers. Major structural are low productivity and
                                                 
22 40% of the work force hold university or higher vocational diplomas. Another 29% hold full
secondary school qualifications.
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inefficiency - “per capita labor productivity is reported to be only 15-20% of that of
most developed countries” (Buckley and Ghauri, 1994:12). Although the legislation in
FDI is effective, it is not sufficient for attracting investment. Privatization,
establishment of joint-ventures with a domestic partner, building an enterprise from
scratch (greenfield construction) represent various ways in which to invest in the
country. The latter possibility is rarely used because of the market’s immaturity. Other
alternatives include different forms of cooperation, licensing and concession
agreements. Table 4 shows the legal and regulatory framework for FDI.
Legal & regulatory environment for foreign investors
Foreign Invest-
ment Laws
The Law on the Business Activity of Foreign Persons and on Protection of
Foreign Investment Law of July 1991 (last amendments in 1996)
Restrictions on
Activities
No restrictions on business activities except the following: license or permission
required for production of military equipment, banking, insurance, activities
obtaining immovable property in certain geographical regions.
Profit & Capital
Repatriation
No restrictions on after-tax profit or capital repatriation
Tax Treatment Tax rate on profit for state budget is 36% (respectively 26% if the profit is up to
2,000,000 leva) while the tax rate on profit for municipalities is 6.5%.
Equal treatment of local and foreign investors - tax holidays.
Participation in
Privatization
Foreign and local investors have equal rights in participation in the privatization
process. Privatization procedures are effective after the authorization from the
relevant ministry but if the mount of assets exceeds leva 70 million -
authorization from the Privatization Agency is required. The Privatization Law
was amended in 1994, 1995 and 1996 to include and regulate voucher
privatization. Holders of Bulgarian Brady Bonds obtained in exchange for
rescheduled Bulgarian debt may use them in privatization with their normal price
(for DISCS) and half of their nominal (for FLIRBS), despite their purchase price.
Property Law Ownership Act (1990), last amendment in 1996.
Law on Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land (passed in 1991, last
amendment in 1995),
State Ownership Act (passed in 1996),
Municipal Ownership Act (passed in 1996).
Foreign persons acting in the capacity of local persons (registered under
Bulgarian Law) may acquire land, although not arable land. They may acquire
real estate and land after permission from the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance.
Legal entities with foreign participation may not hold ownership rights on arable
land, regardless of the share of the foreign participation.
Contract Law The Law on obligations and Contracts (1951, amended 1993) regulates civil
transactions.
The Commercial Code (1991, last amendment in 1996) regulates commercial and
company law.
The Law on Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment Companies (1995)
provides for the issuance of securities and the transactions with them, the activity
of the stock exchanges, the investment intermediaries, the investment companies
and the government control over them.
Bankruptcy
Law
The new Bankruptcy Law came into effect in July 1994 as a chapter in the
Commercial Code.
By the banking and Lending Act (amended in 1996) the legislator introduced
legal regulations concerning bank insolvency. The Law regulates bank
positioning under specific surveillance in danger of insolvency, insolvent
procedures and bank liquidation.
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Anti-trust Law The Act on Protection of Competition of 1991 regulates monopolies and unfair
competition and establishes a special controlling body.
The Commission for Competition.
Company Law The Commercial code (1991, amended 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) provides for
joint-stock companies, limited liability companies and three types of partnerships.
Rigid management is imposed on limited liability companies.
Table 4: The legal and regulatory framework for foreign investment
Source: “Current Foreign Investment Climate in Bulgaria”, Foreign Investment 
   Agency, 1996:19-20
Governmental approval for investment proposals is not required. Profits can be
repatriated, and the IMF Agreement of July 1996 specifies that there will be no
currency exchange controls.
One of the popular attitudes in Bulgaria is that the participation of foreign investors in
the privatization and eventual purchases will lead to the “selling out the country”.
There is a general fear of Bulgarian property being sold out to non-nationals at low
prices. This fear certainly has its grounds, but it imposes a barrier for realizing some
appropriate investment chances. Bearing the modest size of the domestic financial
market in mind, foreign ownership is an appropriate option. The total cumulative value
of all state-owned enterprises by far exceeds the savings of the population, which
means that a lack of foreign investment will delay the process of privatization. Many
Bulgarian companies will be unable to improve their performance without foreign
investors who have the ability and the capital to restructure and modernize production.
The shortage of capital and not least the shortage of qualified managers can partly be
overcome by foreign partners with the ability to improve the production side on the
one hand and to provide a well developed network of outlets that can stimulate sales
and marketing activities.
The most attractive sectors for foreign investors are the food industry, transport,23
textile industry, agriculture, the pharmaceutical industry, tourism. These are branches
in which some of the Bulgarian companies had favorable positions on the international
market before the collapse of the socialist system. It is small businesses rather than
large companies that find the investment climate in Bulgaria favorable.
From the point of view of the size of foreign investment, Bulgaria is outside the world
business map. In the period 1990-1993 the total Western investments in Bulgaria were
                                                 
23  The geographical position of the country explains the fact that the share of foreign investments in
the transport sector has the third position in the total foreign investment in Bulgaria after industry and
trade and is larger than in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
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only 167,5 million USD. The respective numbers for the same period are 500 million
USD for Romania, 2 billion USD for Poland, and 5 billion USD for Hungary. At the
end of 1995 total foreign investment in Bulgaria was approximately 830 million USD.
The Ministry of Economic Development did not realize its intention to create favorable
conditions in order to increase the inflow of foreign investments by setting up a task
force of Bulgarian experts and foreign businessmen who had already been operating in
Bulgaria.
1995 registered a slowdown in the process of foreign direct investment. According to
the report from the Agency for Economic Coordination and Development on
“Bulgarian Economy in 1995 and Prospects for 1996-98”, foreign investment in
Bulgaria totaled approximately 101 million USD in 1995, which is less than the 1994
figure (Pari Newspaper, March 19, 1996) by about 133 million USD. The decrease is
partly compensated for by the considerable growth in indirect investment (32 million
USD) and the so-called other investment (100 million USD). The report stresses that
the average investment is very modest mainly because of legal irregularities,
uncertainties and instability.
According to the National Statistical Institute, foreign investment in Bulgaria in 1995
reached 452 million USD. Industry absorbed 44.3% of the investment, transport
25.9%, and trade 20.1%. Germany still tops the list of foreign investors accounting for
32.2% of the total in 1995. Next came Britain (16.2%), the US (7%), Greece (6.3%),
Belgium, Luxembourg and France. More than half of the foreign investment in 1995
was in the form of foreign currency, 15.6% in leva, and 4.2% in machinery and
equipment (Bulletin of weekly news, October 17, 1996). For the entire period, starting
from 1991 up till the first half of 1996, the structure of the foreign investments by
countries is as illustrated in Table 5:













Table 5: Structure of foreign investments in Bulgaria by countries
Source: Current Foreign Investment Climate in Bulgaria, Foreign Investment Agency, 
 1996:34
In the period January-September 1996 the foreign investment increased 2.19 times in
comparison with the previous year. Over 210 million USD were invested during the
first nine months of 1996. According to the National Statistical Institute, in the
majority of the enterprises - 95.3%, the invested funds came from one country, in 4.2%
- from two, in 0.4% - from three countries, and as few as 0.1% of the enterprises
investments were distributed among more than three countries. In terms of profit
reinvestment, Greece comes first, followed by Ukraine, the US and the UK. Foreign
investments were mainly concentrated in the territory of the Sofia district - they
amounted to some 60% of total foreign investment in Bulgaria.
Among the companies which have invested in Bulgaria are Interbrew (Belgium), Philip
Morris Companies Inc. (USA) through Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Switzerland), Lifton
International A/S through Breakers A/S (Denmark), Nestle S.A. (Switzerland),
International Spedition Willi Betz GmbH (Germany), Heineken N.V. (the Netherlands)
through Brewinvest S.A. (Greece), Rover Group (UK), Luxcraft Trading Ltd. (UK).
The Irish-Bulgarian company Bimak Ltd., a company extracting and processing non-
ferrous metals was announced Foreign Investor of 1995. It was established 6 years
ago, invested 20 million USD and created 100 new jobs. The three largest deals in
1996 were made with Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung which bought 168 Hours
Ltd., with Daewoo which acquired the Sheraton Hotel and a joint venture between
Fayans in Kaspichan and Laufen of Switzerland.
7.2. Corporate restructuring
According to Frydman et al. (1993:35), the corporatization of state-owned enterprises
is “the process by which firms are converted into commercial companies with a
structure familiar in the capitalist system”. The main assumption when talking about
enterprise restructuring as a part of the transformation processes is that corporatization
may reduce costs and increase profitability. By 1995, the formal process of
corporatization of the state-owned sector had  been almost completed in Bulgaria
(Dobrinsky, 1996:391) - the governments reclaimed the actual ownership rights over
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the state-owned enterprises by changing their legal status. These enterprises were
transformed into joint-stock companies or limited liability companies.
Besides the change of the legal status of the enterprises, there have been no serious
efforts to strengthen competition and corporate governance. The insufficient results of
corporate restructuring in Bulgaria is one of the reasons for the lack of economic
growth. The increasing trade deficit can also partly be explained by the lack of
enterprise restructuring. As described by Dobrinsky (op.cit.:393), the program for
financial restructuring in Bulgaria constituted “a swap of bad enterprise debt in the
balance sheets of commercial banks for government securities coupled with the
cancellation or rescheduling of debt in the company books”. In the period 1992-1994,
there were several rounds of bail-out and there are expectations of further ones.
The stabilization measures undertaken in 1991 created additional pressure in terms of
stagnation because of the failure of state-owned industrial enterprises to adjust to the
new conditions of the rapidly changing environment. The stabilization program did not
take into account serious barriers that have hindered its realization. Among these
factors are the imperfection of the domestic market, total lack of competitive behavior
and experience, lack of market-oriented management knowledge and skills, as well as
strong resistance to change. According to the Bulgarian National Bank (the central
bank of the country) and some other sources (EIU Country Report), the inflati n rate
was 334% in 1991, 80% in 1992 and 60% in 1993. In 1994, it rose again to more than
90%. In the first three months of 1996 inflation was approximately 2.5%-3.0% per
month, but it reached 20.3% in June because of the drastic devaluation of the
Bulgarian lev in May 1996 and remained at the level of 20% in September adding up to
a total of 153% in the period since January. In July 1996 inflation was at its highest
since the price liberalization in 1991: 81.9% in the first seven months of 1996 and
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Figure 4: Annual inflation
Source: EBRD, IMF, quoted in Business Central Europe, The Annual 1996/1997,
December, 1996:41
The agreement with the London Club from 1994 assumed a 5% inflation growth for
1996. This is far from reality. It can hardly happen in 1997. 12% of the annual inflation
in 1996 was due to the exchange rate which was 6.6 times higher at the end of 1996
than at the end of 1995. One fifth is due to the direct impact of the electricity and fuel
tariffs. Among other causes of the inflation are the decreasing production (around 5-
7%), the poor crop, the increasing prices of the goods controlled by the government
and the falling domestic demand. The chronic budget deficit and the floating exchange
rate are other important factors responsible for maintaining the inflation at a very high
level. The accumulated high inflation potential means that even if the currency board is
introduced, the inflation will not decrease substantially. As a temporary measure
against high inflation and as an effort to stabilize the foreign currency market and the
banking system, the Central Bank drastically raised the central interest rate.24 Later, in
October 1996, the Central Bank reduced the base interest rate from 300% annually
(25% monthly) to 240% annually (20% a month).
The beginning of the changes in late 1989 resulted in an abolishment of the
employment guarantee which was typical for the socialist society. Bulgaria has the
highest unemployment rates in the group of transitional countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. The National Statistical Institute (NSI) estimates the country’s labor
force at 3,552,000. According to data from the National Employment Service, in
January 1996, 11.6% of the economically active population was unemployed.
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However, both institutions base their figures on the records of the job centers which
register less than half of the actual unemployed.25 Therefore, it is very difficult to claim
that the data in this area are exact. Following estimates of the EBRD, employment in
manufacturing fell by 7-18% every year in Bulgaria during 1992-1995 (Transition
Report, 1996:24).
The social safety net in Bulgaria is financed by payroll taxes of 35-50% as well as by
transfers from the state budget and is a crucial source of income in low-income
households. The net consists of pensions, unemployment benefits and maternity, child
and family benefits. The pensions system is not sustainable. The ratio of pensioners to
contributors was 86% in 1994, as a result of overly generous entitlement criteria, an
aging population and the early retirement of redundant workers (EBRD Transition
Report, 1996:144). Expenditure on social protection constituted more than 13% of
GDP in 1992 and represented 11% of GDP in 1995, but the real benefit levels were
extremely low. The entire social safety net does not function sufficiently and the cash
benefit system is widely considered to be both ineffective and not affordable (Hassan &
Peters, op.cit.:640).
The disintegration of the Comecon-market caused significant changes in terms of
Bulgarian exports. The introduction of trade in convertible currencies at world market
prices caused a completely new and highly unfavorable situation for traditional
Bulgarian exports (such as products of the manufacturing industry). According to
surveys conducted by the Bulgarian Trade Ministry, at present, two-thirds of Bulgarian
exports are received by risk markets, such as the Arab countries and the CIS
(Bulgarian Telegraph Agency Weekly News, various numbers) and the ex-Soviet
Union has remained Bulgaria’s largest trading partner. Products within the same
industrial branch vary a great deal in quality according to their respective place of
production being either Western or Eastern countries. This makes it difficult to
reorient the trade flows from the Eastern to the Western markets. Such a process is
possible only if  serious changes in production technologies, production processes and
                                                                                                                                
24  Since most prices in the banking sector are directly linked to the central interest rate, the latter is a
powerful financial tool in the country.
25  Between 225,000 and 375,000 Bulgarians are working on the black labor market. According to
figures calculated by sociologists of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 6-10% of the active
population work unprotected by the social safety net. These are mainly members of families who work
unpaid and uninsured in their family companies. Some 150,000 pensioners earn money in the same
manner. Nearly half of the working pensioners have not signed labor contracts. At least 35,000-
40,000 of those who work without contracts are officially registered as unemployed. Some 6% of the
people employed in the public sector take up additional jobs without signing contracts and paying
taxes. (See “Douma” newspaper, December 13, 1995)
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work force qualification take place. Changes in the latter require foreign direct
investment on a large scale.
The financial results of Bulgarian companies operating in export-oriented industries are
better than the average although the behavior of foreign exchange rates deter rather
than promote Bulgarian exports. Chemicals, products of the ferrous and non-ferrous
metallurgy, mineral products, machinery and equipment are among the highest hard
currency earners and at the same time these are the industries that record the highest
growth during the last years. In general, 40681Bulgaria does not sufficiently use and take
advantage of the possibility to create and improve its access to foreign markets. The
policy of the 1995-1996 government was to limit the import of finished goods using
the possibilities of the fiscal, customs and foreign exchange mechanisms.
One can hardly speculate on the fact that, at present, international financial institutions
are the Bulgarian economy’s basic real source of financing. Under such circumstances,
there is limited choice for the country in terms of whether or not to comply with the
conditions and requirements formulated by these institutions. The question remains,
however, as to what extent and how speedily these requirements are implemented. In
the spring of 1996, the World Bank determined that a country must have an agreement
with the International Monetary Fund before the World Bank would agree to finance
the country. The World Bank requires a strict and specific program for structural
adjustment of the economy including acceleration of privatization, reform in the
financial sector and improvement of the financial discipline in state-owned enterprises.
Bearing in mind that the World Bank is interested in financing a country which
undergoes a real process of restructuring and not simply slight and cosmetic changes,
the institution does however, place strict market conditional requirements before
providing credits. It had two main requirements towards the Bulgarian government -
immediate close-down of 64 enterprises which detracted money from the economy26
and isolation of 71 other chronically deficit-producing companies by putting them
under a special regime which would not allow them to receive bank credits.27 The
companies in question have accumulated considerable amounts of bad debt. These
“financial black holes” (Gomulka, 1994) were grouped according to their financial
results and were meant to be restructured and possibly privatized. However, this can
                                                 
26  These 64 enterprises were responsible for one-third of the negative value added generated in
Bulgaria in 1995.
27  For a period of three years (1993-1995) the losses of inefficient enterprises have come up to 20% of
the GDP (about 2,000 million USD) a year. The loosing enterprises in Bulgaria are 2056 with over
than 180,000 employees.
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hardly happen bearing both their technical and financial state in mind. The other option
- to let these enterprises sink into bankruptcy seems to be the more likely outcome
even though there are strong political considerations to be taken into account when
taking such decisions and even though the social price will be significantly high - most
of these companies are large and some supply whole regions with their industrial
profile.
Liquidating money-loosing and non-competitive state-run enterprises turned out to be
a difficult step for the Bulgarian government. Although it formally required the closure
of most of the 64 enterprises, it preferred the rehabilitation of the enterprises to their
liquidation. It was announced that fast privatization of the enterprises on the
liquidation list would be preferable. The Privatization Agency sold some of them but in
general, the financial system was not able to allocate existing financial resources for
productive uses. The IMF suspended a 582 million USD stabilization loan to the
country after the government failed to close these state enterprises.
The rehabilitation process of the companies in isolation is even more slow. According
the provisional Law on the Financial Rehabilitation of State-Owned enterprises, there
are certain procedures of drawing up the rehabilitation programs, their revision and
approval, and finally implementation of the rehabilitation programs by the enterprises
in question. Therefore, results of this process can not be expected to be available
before 1998. Since rehabilitation measures have been deemed urgent in Bulgaria’s
case, this slow-down is disapproved by the IMF.
The implementation of a stronger structural policy in Bulgaria is hindered by the
monopolist positions some of the enterprises have. As discussed in Section 2,
monopolies have strong traditions in Bulgarian economy. Since enterprises were
situated in a stable and non-competitive environment, they were not motivated to
introduce innovations. It is difficult to expect that those enterprises will be willing to
change even if they face a crisis. Companies are inclined towards inertia as a result of a
combination of various factors and inertia promotes maintenance of the status quo,
even if clearly dysfunctional processes are present. As pointed out by Murrell
(1992:47), “the essence of the problem of macro economics stability during reform lies
in the incompatibility between the new market environment and the enterprise behavior
and expectations that are a heritage of the past. The old systems accommodated
themselves to certain features of enterprise behavior, among them the tendency to
disregard financial constraints in the face of seemingly more urgent real priorities.
Given the stability of the old system over a number of decades, one might conclude
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that, within the constraints, such accommodation was successful in controlling or
neutralizing those elements of enterprise behavior that had most immediate
dysfunctional consequences”.
8. Highlights and conclusions
The transition processes in Bulgaria so far support the view that the “Jump into the
market” (Csaba, 1992) is not a textbook case from which solutions are easily available
and transferable. The results of six years of transition look disappointing and
pessimistic. From the previous sections we can conclude that the Bulgarian economy is
in a state of collapse. The industries are declining, a large number of companies
operate at a loss and the prospects for many others are bad. Many industrial enterprises
reached the bottom line without being able to turn up again, others are “starting from
below zero” (Sullivan, 1992).
The Madrid Declaration, adopted by the IMF in 1994, defined two main aims for
economies in transition: integration into the international economy and laying the
foundations of sustainable growth. Bulgaria has not taken any of these to heart. Other
countries in similar situations had competent rulers who were able to overcome the
transition problems by developing and executing long-term programs. Up till now,
Bulgaria has not adjusted flexibly to the changes along the path of transition and
doubts about the country’s ability to meet the transformation targets are growing.
At the beginning of 1997, the country is more unstable than it was in the beginning of
1990. With regards to the reasons for the current crisis, it must be emphasized that
there are several factors to be taken into account: Bulgaria started its economic
transition under particularly difficult conditions, the introduction of structural
transformation and privatization were delayed considerably, the banking sector
collapsed totally, and the country did not succeed in attracting foreign investment. The
most serious and pressing problems Bulgaria has to solve are related to the avoidance
of a financial collapse and the speeding up of the process of economic recovery. The
government is faced with the challenge of structurally reforming the economy but there
is no substantial progress in the formulation and implementation of appropriate
stabilization and structural adjustment policy. Structural imbalances are to be reduced.
In terms of objectives, reduction of the budget deficit and a prudent monetary policy
cannot be avoided. One of the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the facts
presented is that substantial institutional changes in Bulgaria have been very slow and
far from sufficient.
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The macro economics imbalances as well as the price pressures being extremely high
and unstable keep the living standards and quality of life at a very low level. There is
no workable system for social protection. The unemployment rates are likely to rise
considerably in 1997. Closing down deficit-producing enterprises, dismissing their
personnel, in addition to reducing staff numbers in various budget organizations will be
difficult to avoid. A major challenge ahead is the improvement of micro economic
efficiency. The development of privatization in Bulgaria is of great importance to the
transition processes in general. The commitment to transparency is relevant for
winning public understanding, confidence and acceptance. The rules for advertising the
participation conditions and procedures should be made as broadly known as possible
and should be equal for all participants. Participation needs to be more active in order
to create real possibilities to sell the enterprises at the best price. People need to
believe that companies are sold fairly, impartially and at high prices.
As indicated above, foreign investments are crucial to the recovery and development of
Bulgaria’s economy. The perspectives do not look encouraging: the country does not
look to be in a position to attract larger flows of foreign capital and it will remain in
the periphery of foreign investors’ attraction. It is not realistic to expect large capital
inflows of foreign direct investment. Therefore, the country needs a new image based
on real achievements. Despite the liberal investment laws that have been passed, a
long-term security of the property rights of foreign investors is needed. Serious efforts
are required  to develop a reputation for honoring past implicit or explicit contractual
commitments to foreign investors (OECD, 1997:1-2).
As stated by Whitley (1985:14), “the transformation of a command economy to a
market economy clearly requires more than the sale of state assets to a private sector,
not least because these assets are rarely organized into coherent units which could
form the basis of independent economic actors. Thus, all former state socialist societies
have to reorganize production units, manage inter-enterprise debt and reallocate
resources if they are to develop viable firms for a market economy”. Hirschhausen
(1995:54) draws a similar conclusion: “Where reformers expected rapid privatization
to guarantee immediate restructuring, it has proved impossible to convert socialist
industrial structures to the new monetary environment by a mere change of ownership
[...]”. Therefore, privatization is not to be considered  in isolation but rather in the
context of the broader processes of economic restructuring.
Industrial restructuring goes beyond privatization of state-owned enterprises and their
transformation into viable firms. It requires serious changes in market orientation,
production technology and management / employee-behavior. A deeper integration in
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international markets, consideration of environmental issues and imposing motivating
mechanisms to act competitively are only some of the concerns that follow from the
above mentioned aspects of change. The lack of policy consistent  as well as the lack
of a longer-term strategy for restructuring were the main reasons for not progressing in
economic terms. Restructuring requires enterprise-closures and this leads to
employment losses as an unavoidable process in the period of transition.
The serious crisis Bulgaria faces is a force in its own right and can spawn a deep
transformation. On the way “from ‘real socialism’ to ‘somewhere’” (Schmidt, 1995a:4)
the complexities of the tasks facing the country require a growing national consensus
on the resolution of key problems. In addition the process requires the constructive
interactions and coalitions between the political parties in their concentrated efforts to
overcome the current crisis. Under circumstances of disagreement on the solution to
existing problems and a lack of commitment to pursue a valid solution, it is hard to
implement a consistent and visionary reform program.
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Appendix 1: The Bulgarian Political Reality until 1990
Communist Party 1918
Dominant party of the Fatherland Front organization which claims 800 000 members.
Founded from a splinter group of the moderate left Social Democratic Party (1893).
Renamed Bulgarian Socialist Party (1989).
Agrarians’ Union 1899
Founded to protect farming and related industries. Main body continued as
Stambouliisky’s party when Draghyeff’s party broke away in 1919 as a more moderate
group, defending parliamentary methods in politics.
Democratic Party 1895
Founded as a group to reconcile differing parties with a centre policy. In 1906 the
Radical Party split off, in support of co-operatives, radical tax reforms and a
federation of Balkan states.
National Liberal Party 1920
United three small parties to rebuild post-war Bulgaria and gain a revision of the peace
treaty. Stambouloff’s National Liberal Party broke away in 1925.
Party of the Democratic Entente 1923
Moderate reform party committed to peace and strengthening of the law and the
economy.
Bulgarian Socialist Party 1989
Formerly the Bulgarian Communist Party
Union of Democratic Forces 1989
A coalition of 16 opposition groups including the Bulgarian Workers Social
Democratic Party, he Citizens’ Initiative Movement and the Ecoglasnost Independent
Association.
Movement for Rights and Freedom 1989
The Party of the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria
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